We show that intergenerational mobility changed rapidly by race and class in recent decades in the U.S. and study the causal mechanisms underlying those changes. Between the 1978 and 1992 birth cohorts, earnings increased for white children from high-income families relative to white children from low-income families, increasing earnings gaps by parental income (“class”) by 30%. Earnings increased for Black children at all parental income levels, reducing white-Black earnings gaps for children from low-income families by 30%. Class gaps grew and race gaps shrank similarly for non-monetary outcomes such as educational attainment, standardized test scores, and mortality rates. Using a quasi-experimental design, we show that the divergent trends in economic mobility were caused by differential changes in childhood environments, as proxied by parental employment rates, within local communities defined by race, class, and childhood county. Outcomes improve across birth cohorts for children who grow up in communities with increasing parental employment rates, with larger effects for children who move to such communities at younger ages. Children’s outcomes are most strongly related to the parental employment rates of peers they are more likely to interact with, such as those in their own birth cohort, suggesting that the relationship between children’s outcomes and parental employment rates is mediated by social interaction.
How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions without communication and in the absence of focal points is a long-standing question in game theory. We show that a cost—benefit approach to reasoning in strategic settings delivers sharp theoretical predictions that address this central question. In particular, our model predicts that, for a large class of individual reasoning processes, coordination in some canonical games is more likely to arise when players perceive heterogeneity in their cognitive abilities, rather than homogeneity. In addition, and perhaps contrary to common perception, it is not necessarily the case that being of higher cognitive sophistication is beneficial to the agent. We show that subjects’ behavior in a laboratory experiment is consistent with the predictions of our model, and present evidence against alternative coordination mechanisms.
How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions without communication and in the absence of focal points is a long-standing question in game theory. We show that a cost-benefit approach to reasoning in strategic settings delivers sharp theoretical predictions that address this central question. In particular, our model predicts that, for a large class of individual reasoning processes, coordination in some canonical games is more likely to arise when players perceive heterogeneity in their cognitive abilities, rather than homogeneity. In addition, and perhaps contrary to common perception, it is not necessarily the case that being of higher cognitive sophistication is beneficial to the agent. We show that subjects’ behavior in a laboratory experiment is consistent with the predictions of our model, and present evidence against alternative coordination mechanisms.
The qualitative analysis of open-ended interviews has vast potential in economics but has found limited use. This is partly because the interpretative, nuanced human reading of text and coding that it requires is labour intensive and very time consuming. This paper presents a method to simplify and shorten the coding process by extending a small sample of interpretative human-annotated interviews to a larger, representative, sample using supervised natural language processing. We extensively assess the robustness and reliability of this approach to show when and how it adds value, including an analysis of how many human-annotated documents are optimal for a budget constrained researcher. We apply this approach to analyse 2,200 open-ended interviews on parent’s aspirations for children with Rohingya refugees and their Bangladeshi hosts. We show that studying aspirations with open-ended interviews extends the economics focus on material goals to ideas from philosophy and anthropology that emphasize aspirations for moral and religious values, and the navigational capacity to achieve these aspirations. This approach allows us to identify several novel results including a new type of migrant selection; we show that Rohingya refugees are negatively selected on education but positively selected on navigational capacity.
Institutions under Pressure: The Effect of Community Groups on Forest Preservation after a Natural Disaster
We analyse the resilience of community-based institutions to large shocks. Our case study is on forest user groups in Nepal in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake. We combine remote sensing data with detailed administrative data on forest user groups and exploit spatial variation in the intensity of the earthquake. Using a triple difference strategy, we show that the earthquake-induced increase in deforestation is significantly lower in locations with a higher share of forest covered by forest user groups. Thus, these institutions lead to more sustainable use of forests when they are under pressure. Regarding potential mechanisms, survey data suggest that social capital plays a role for the positive effects of forest user groups. More generally, our findings show that shifting governance of local resources to community-based institutions can be an effective policy in times of increased pressure on natural resources.
Keeping up with the Joneses to Impress the Smiths: Conspicuous Consumption in a Society with Income Segregation
I develop a signalling model to study how income segregation impacts conspicuous consumption when neighbourhood income distributions are the reference for social comparisons, but consumers signal to an outside observer. Consumers can have different attitudes to status: conformists have a greater incentive for conspicuous consumption when they have many well-off neighbours, while snobs have a greater incentive when they have few well-off neighbours. Despite the neighbourhood income distribution affecting the incentives of snobs and conformists in starkly different ways, I show that conspicuous consumption is always higher in a more segregated society.